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Critical Infrastructure in the Future City
Developing Secure and Resilient Cyber–Physical Systems
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Abstract. Cities face serious challenges that affect competitiveness, sus-
tainability and their occupants’ safety & security. In response, investment
is made in city infrastructure projects. Given the complexity of the sys-
tems architecture, and interactions between physical and cyber domains,
this paper shows how a multi-disciplinary approach can be adopted to
address the challenges. It introduces an analysis methodology for use by
multi-disciplinary teams to allow the dependencies and interactions of
cyber–physical systems in physical–cyber environments to be explored.
The analysis methodology offers a systematic way to study the cyber–
physical systems and identify safety, security or resilience issues that
need to be addressed in the systems design or operation.
Keywords: Smart cities, cyber–physical systems, cyber security, re-
silience, trustworthy software, critical infrastructure, physical–cyber en-
vironment, future city
1 Introduction
Projections indicate that 60% of the world’s population will be urbanised by 2030
[1]. This compares to less than 40% of the global population living in cities in
1990 and with fewer than 10% of urban dwellers living in cities with populations
<500,000 people [2]. The WHO anticipates that population growth in cities over
the next 30 years will occur in developing countries [2]. This indicates that by
the middle of the 21st century, the urban population of developing countries will
more than double. This growth will result in the expansion of existing cities and
development of new ones. Areas where these cities develop are often on coastal
plains, putting them at greater risk from severe weather events and changes in
sea levels [3].
The increasing size of urban populations creates significant challenges for fu-
ture cities, dubbed as ’smart cities’, where complex interactions between Cyber–
Physical Systems (CPS) will aim to improve the quality of life and to proactively
manage demand for scarce or costly resources. Creating future cities will present
significant technical and economic challenges for both developed and developing
nations.
Use of technology is not without risks, particularly with regard to the re-
silience and cyber security of critical city infrastructure. Future cities will evolve
into sophisticated platforms, comprising systems-of-systems-of-systems or physical–
cyber environments. There will also be a greater degree of system autonomy
where humans will be relegated to the role of supervisor or maintainer, giving
birth to a new breed of ’Cyber Janitor’.
Future cities will challenge existing safety and security engineering models
e.g. the United States electricity blackout in 2003 [4] showed that in interde-
pendent networks a very small failure in one network might lead to catastrophic
consequences [5]. New and complex cascading failure modes will arise out of
unforeseen or emergent system characteristics as they are developed in an incre-
mental and ad hoc fashion, especially where more sophisticated technologies are
added to an already ageing physical infrastructure.
This paper examines some challenges to be addressed if we are to understand
and manage the potential future impacts. It starts by examining the nature of
CPS and the evolution of the city as a platform. To understand the requirements
this paper considers a city from three perspectives: the context of its data and
systems, understanding resilience of systems and services, and an approach to
deriving its cyber security needs. These perspectives form the basis of an analysis
methodology under development by the authors.
2 Cyber–physical systems and The City as a Platform
There are a number of definitions of CPS [6–9]. Common features effectively
describe control systems, networked and/or distributed, incorporating a degree of
intelligence (adaptive or predictive), and work in real time to influence outcomes
in the real world. These definitions point to the diverse nature of CPS found
in transportation, utilities, buildings, infrastructure, manufacturing, and health
care.
Although CPS have similarities with traditional data processing systems, e.g.
their networked or distributed nature and a degree of automation, the real-time
nature of their interactions with the physical world is a significant difference.
Interactions are sensors detecting and measuring physical parameters with ac-
tuators to control physical processes. Feedback loops allow data about the en-
vironment and the physical processes to be collected and computed. Actuation
may be automatic or by an alert to a human operator.
Critical infrastructure systems are CPS, whose failure would have economic
or social impact. Society expects systems will operate in a safe, secure and con-
sistent manner [10]. In response to environmental, demographic and societal
pressures, cities may no longer conduct business as usual. Traditional city mod-
els are no longer appropriate, as transport and utility infrastructures becomes
unsustainable and requires significant investment [11].
Some cities have embraced the concept of the ’city as a platform’, a hyper-
connected urban environment that harnesses the network effects, openness, and
agility of the real-time web [12]. The focus has been on access to data, leading to
development of smartphone apps and portals allowing citizens to ’connect’ with
city services and institutions [13, 14]. To address cyber security requirements we
need to understand the proliferation of functions in this hyper-connected world
[15]. Where functions in individual CPS interact, they will create new functions
that will proliferate over time. To protect these complex systems we need to
understand their network of functions, relationships and interdependencies. A
study of critical infrastructure interdependencies [16] led to the identification of
six dimensions, which can be used to examine CPS and supporting infrastruc-
tures:
– Type of interdependency, e.g. cyber, physical, logical or geographic;
– Environment, e.g. business, economic, public policy, legal, regulatory, secu-
rity, technical, health/safety, or social/political;
– Coupling and response behaviour, e.g. adaptive, inflexible, loose/tight or
linear/complex;
– Infrastructure characteristics, e.g. spatial, operational, organisational or tem-
poral;
– Type of failure, e.g. common cause, escalating or cascading;
– State of operation, e.g. normal, stressed/disrupted, restoration or repair.
The study is a useful starting point in understanding interdependencies between
city systems and infrastructure, however, the sophistication of solutions today is
greater than those contemplated in 2001. The increased integration and automa-
tion of city systems requires a broader understanding of the ’city as a platform’
if solutions are to deliver resilience and cyber security.
3 Future Cities Analysis Framework
We propose an analysis framework, which examines the critical city infrastruc-
ture and services from three perspectives: context, resilience, and cyber security.
The analysis framework (Figure 1), builds on our work regarding the cyber se-
curity of buildings [17], adapted to focus at a city level on critical infrastructure
and related services.
3.1 Identifying critical city infrastructure
Whilst there are a number of definitions for critical national infrastructure [18–
20], from a city perspective the concept of critical infrastructure is not well
defined. The UK’s definition of critical national infrastructure (CNI) is: "those
facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the coun-
try and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK
depends" [19]. Where criticality is determined based on a Criticality Scale [21],
which assesses impact of events or scenarios on a national scale. From a city
perspective, we propose that criticality addresses elements necessary for the de-
livery of essential services to the populace who are resident and/or work in the
city and that impact is focused at city rather than national level. The critical
infrastructure must encompass both the city’s normal operating state, and its
ability to effectively respond to natural or other disasters [22]. Our definition of
a city’s critical infrastructure translates the principles underlying criticality at
a national level to apply them at a city level based on four factors:
Fig. 1. Analysis Framework for secure and resilient Future Cities
– the impact on delivery of essential societal functions and services, e.g. to
provide water, food and shelter, and to maintain law and order;
– the economic impact on the well-being and viability of the city, e.g. the ability
to operate as a business and financial centre and provide employment;
– the impact on life, health and well-being of city occupants, e.g. to provide
medical and social services to protect and care for citizens;
– the ability to respond to major incidents or disasters, e.g. to provide emer-
gency services including sites to manage emergency operations and to provide
housing in the event of a disaster.
The result of applying these factors to a typical city’s infrastructure is illustrated
in Table 1, which also identifies whether an element would normally be regarded
as part of the critical national infrastructure.
Critical City Infrastructure Critical National Infrastructure
Communications Yes
Education (Schools, Colleges, Universities) No
Emergency Services Yes
Energy (Electricity, Gas, Oil/Petroleum products) Yes
Financial Services Yes
Food Yes
Government (City administration) Yes
Health Yes
Leisure (Parks, Sport Facilities) No
Transport (Road, Rail, Air, Waterborne) Yes
Water Yes
Table 1. Proposed components of critical city infrastructure
The extension of generally accepted critical infrastructure to include educa-
tion and leisure facilities recognises the critical role they can play in emergencies.
For example, in Hurricane Katrina the New Orleans Superbowl was used as an
emergency relief centre. Large open spaces, such as parks or sports fields can also
be used as locations for temporary accommodation or to provide alternative sites
for managing disaster operations in the event of a natural disaster [22].
3.2 Understanding the context
The resilience and cyber security requirements of a future city require a holis-
tic view of the relevant systems, services and their interdependencies. This is
important where a network of independently operated systems including sys-
tems operating external to the city provides the essential functionality. A smart
environment must be able to both detect the current state or context in the en-
vironment and determine what actions to take based on this context information
[23].
To establish the resilience and cyber security requirements for a future city’s
CPS, the seven dimensions of cyber [24, 25] need to be analysed and the context
under which they are operating understood. The dimensions are: human, aware-
ness/understanding, information/data, spectrum, systems, infrastructure, and
the environment. E.g. understanding the spectrum and channels used for com-
munications and sharing both data and control signals will help to understand
the impact of interference, jamming, electro-magnetic pulses and solar weather
events on the city’s infrastructure.
3.3 Resilience of a city’s cyber–physical systems
The Rockefeller Foundation and Arup developed a City Resilience Framework
[26]. The Framework defines a resilient system as having seven qualities: reflec-
tive, robust, redundant, flexible, resourceful, inclusive, integrated. These indica-
tors are important as they provide a holistic view of resilience as it applies to
a city. E.g. a resilient city has effective city leadership, good infrastructure, so-
cial cohesion, collective identity and relative prosperity. This is illustrated in the
contrast between the recovery of Port au Prince, Haiti following an earthquake
in 2010 and New York’s response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 [26].
3.4 Defining cyber security for cyber–physical systems
The future city will be a complex environment comprising a variety of tech-
nologies, existing and emerging. The cyber security approach adopted may vary
considerably, depending on factors such as asset and systems complexity, owner-
ship and use. The supply chain supporting design, construction, operation and
occupation of individual assets or systems also affect the future city. Applying
current information security practice to deliver cyber security of the city as a
platform is extremely complex if not impossible. The fragmented ownership of in-
dividual components within the platform, diverse interfaces and constant change
will all limit the effectiveness of traditional control measures. Cyber security of
CPS is complicated by the real-time nature of the systems and the potential
safety critical elements of their functionality. Applying the traditional CIA triad
[27], used by the information security community, does not adequately address
the safety and control aspects of CPS. An alternative approach that combines
engineering good practice with information security may be achieved by adapting
the Parkerian Hexad [28] with the addition of safety as a seventh element [25].
This results in cyber security being considered using the following elements: con-
fidentiality, possession and/or control, integrity, authenticity, availability, utility,
safety. Table 2 illustrates how these elements relate to the design and operation
of the city’s CPS.
Element Relevance to cyber–physical systems
Confidentiality Protection of personal and other sensitive data
Possession/Control Prevent unauthorised manipulation or control of systems
Integrity Prevention of unauthorised changes to or deletion of data,
and maintenance of system configuration
Authenticity Prevention of fraud or tampering with data
Availability City infrastructure able to operate without disruption or
impairment
Utility Maintaining data and systems in a useful state through-
out their lifecycle
Safety Prevention of harm to individuals, assets and the environment
Table 2. Application of cyber security elements
4 Applying the framework to city infrastructure
With the increasing sophistication and integration of city systems and the need
to protect their growing populations, there is a need for city planners to con-
sider risk, resilience and cyber security in a holistic manner. The two examples
below illustrate how critical CPS and poor planning may disable generators and
transport systems. The example from Hurricane Sandy of cross-sector depen-
dencies was the impact of the storm on energy supplies. A post storm study [29]
exposed risks that were not understood by dependent critical sectors and gov-
ernment officials, due in part to their limited understanding of sector operations
and distribution. The study highlights that:
– without power, even well stocked gasoline service stations were unable to
pump fuel to customers;
– emergency managers struggled to determine which gasoline stations had both
fuel and power;
– refineries and supply terminals that lost power also had major water damage
to primary switch gear and other critical electrical components that delayed
restoration long after power was restored;
– many critical dependent sites limited to 24 hours of fuel storage required
repeated daily refuelling runs for generators;
– the regulation on fuel storage creates disincentives to store greater supplies.
The analysis framework, which is summarised in Figure 2, is a structured
approach to analysing city infrastructure and systems. Due to the interdepen-
dencies between city systems and services, it should be applied on a citywide
basis rather than focused on single systems or services. Whilst the framework
is intended to work at an overall systems level, by addressing the interactions
and dependencies of the ’city as a platform’, it may also be used within systems
to understand complex sub-system relationships and behaviour. The framework
has been tested on the CCTV and associated area management systems in a
major UK city [30].
Fig. 2. Applying the analysis framework to a city
The approach used to test the framework was to identify the set of affected
systems, which included a number of control rooms. The context and role of
the control rooms was examined, including the relationships between the areas
of coverage. The resilience requirements were investigated, taking into account
the need to manage major annual events and public safety incidents. Finally the
cyber security requirements and current systems issues were investigated. In col-
lating the results a number of deficiencies were identified, including a significant
loss of capability following a system upgrade. The discovery of this loss and the
rapid advances in the technology employed in ’smart’ cities confirmed the need
for regular reviews, to monitor changes in systems and infrastructure, identify
new dependencies and emergent functionality arising from systems integration
or interconnectivity.
The framework draws together information that may not be apparent to an
infrastructure owner or operator, e.g. one recently discovered correlation between
the three perspectives occurred in a power distribution network. The operator
is increasing the use of the mobile telephony network to manage the field main-
tenance workforce. The mobile telephone network is not robust when there are
power supply interruptions. In the event of a major supply outage, e.g. following
a severe weather incident, due to the operator’s reliance on the mobile telephone
network (Context – Spectrum), the field workforce will not have access to a ro-
bust communications platform (Resilience – Robust), leading to a potential loss
of command and control communications (Cyber Security – Availability).
5 Discussion
Development of smart cities where there is greater reliance on information and
communications technologies represents a significant challenge for city author-
ities. Even as standalone IT and communication systems, as a consequence of
component failure or due to software design and coding errors, these technologies
are significantly less reliable than the physical assets. A city suffering frequent
systems outages and/or disruptions may become a volatile environment, partic-
ularly during seasonal weather extremes.
In the past, resilience studies focused mainly on geophysical issues and on
the physical engineering aspects related to the protection of infrastructure from
natural events, such as earthquakes, tsunami and extreme weather, or from ter-
rorism related activity. However, the increasing volumes of CPS necessitate the
development of new techniques to allow the complexity of, and relationships be-
tween, these systems to be understood. The situation is further complicated by
the emergent nature of many CPS, with incremental deployment of enhance-
ments and upgrades onto existing infrastructure.
Where upgrades involve information and communications technologies, sys-
tem designers often attach Internet facing elements to legacy systems or make
use of wireless technologies. Both of these developments introduce cyber security
and resilience vulnerabilities.
The systems architecture of a future city is likely to be constantly evolving,
with new components added and existing elements progressively upgraded or
replaced. At any instant, the future city is therefore likely to be a complex
hybrid of established, proven systems, with known constraints and defects, and
newer systems whose behaviour and performance are still being established. It
is likely that technical standards will also evolve over time, so systems will be
built to differing risk profiles, availability and security standards.
This analysis framework provides a structured, systematic way of examining
CPS, to identify any safety, security or resilience issues that need to be addressed
in the design or operation of the systems. The three perspectives combine infor-
mation about environmental, societal, process and technical dependencies and
risks. This approach is not intended to replace the technical risk assessment tech-
niques used in systems engineering, such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
or Cause and Effect Analysis. Instead it provides an approach, which may be
used at city level to explore vulnerabilities in the design and use of complex
integrated CPS.
6 Conclusions
The expectation of future cities is that information and communications tech-
nologies, autonomy and CPS will be harnessed to deliver a safe, secure and sus-
tainable environment for their rapidly growing populations. This dependence on
technology is not without significant risk as the complex CPS that are already
being developed will increasingly interact with each other. When the systems
start to behave as a platform, the city becomes exposed to cascading failure
modes, where apparently unrelated events may cause significant disruption or
even loss of life.
The analysis framework described in this paper is intended to provide an ap-
proach for analysing the city level risks and vulnerabilities to inform both system
planning and design. It should also enable the city authorities and infrastructure
owner to make informed decisions about where systems need to be reinforced or
reengineered to improve resilience and reduce cyber security risks.
Without a clear framework such as the one proposed here, it will be difficult
to analyse the complex interactions and relationships between cyberÃśphysical
systems in a future city. The approach to systems thinking outlined in this paper
enables multi-disciplinary teams to adopt a common approach to sharing infor-
mation about the operation, dependencies and potential vulnerabilities of their
systems or infrastructure. Using this consolidated view should enable security
and resilience issues to be identified and addressed.
A comprehensive analysis methodology is under development by the authors,
which builds on the framework outlined in this paper. Further work is also un-
derway regarding the definition of cyber security of CPS. The work in both of
these areas will be published in due course.
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